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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Gary Watkins appeals from the sentence enhancement he 
received under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C.  
§ 924(e).  In the district court, Watkins challenged the 
assertion in the presentence report that he had previously been 
convicted of five violent felonies.  He argues that, as a result, 
the court should not have imposed an ACCA enhancement without 
requiring the government to produce a certified copy of each 
prior judgment of conviction.  We will affirm his sentence. 
 
 I. 
 One week after a federal grand jury charged Watkins 
with a number of firearms violations, the government filed an 
information putting him on notice that it would seek an enhanced 
sentence based upon four prior violent felony convictions.  The 
information identified one prior conviction for burglary and 
three prior convictions for robbery, all in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.  Watkins pled guilty to 
one count of the indictment. 
 The presentence report identified five prior felony 
convictions by the court of conviction, the case file number, the 
date of arrest, the date of sentencing, the offense charged 
(e.g., "Burglary," "Robbery") and the sentence imposed.  In 
addition, the presentence report described the conduct leading to 
each conviction.  Watkins' 1982 burglary conviction was reported 
to have been based on his entering a barber shop after hours and 
stealing two television sets, a hair dryer, a prism box, and $90 
in cash.  The robbery convictions were reported to have been 
based on the following incidents, each of which involved Watkins 
and two other confederates:  On July 26, 1983, Watkins, armed 
with a sawed-off shotgun, robbed a grocery store; two days later, 
Watkins entered a cafe, threatened to shoot the person tending 
the cash register, and took $772 from the register while his 
companions robbed two store patrons of $363; on August 4, 1983, 
Watkins, armed with a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle, robbed a man 
of $182 as he left a bar; and on August 22, 1992, Watkins robbed 
a man in a car of $5 while he held a sawed-off shotgun to the 
victim's head. 
 Prior to the sentencing hearing, Watkins filed 
"Objections to Enhanced Sentencing" in which he refers to the 
convictions reported in the presentence report and states, 
without further elaboration, that he "denies that he has at least 
three prior convictions for violent felonies."  At the sentencing 
hearing, the ambiguity inherent in this conclusory statement was 
clarified in the following colloquy: 
 The Court:  All right.  Do you wish to pursue 
your request concerning the application of 
the enhancement for the armed career criminal 
[act]? 
 
 Mr. Siegel:  [Watkins' counsel]  Yes, we do, 
Your Honor.  Your Honor, I think the 
objections state--the written objections 
state [Watkins'] objection, which is that we 
do not consider him to be an armed career 
criminal, and specifically, we challenge the 
assertion that these prior convictions 
constitute violent felonies under the act.  
Thank you, Your Honor. 
 
 The Court:  Mr. Carlson. 
 
 Mr. Carlson:  [the prosecutor]  Your Honor, I 
think it's quite clear that the defendant's 
prior criminal record does involve what would 
be violent felonies that would count under 
the armed career criminal statute, and his 
simple denial that he views them as violent 
crimes doesn't create any sort of factual 
issue that would merit the Court not pursuing 
the armed career criminal penalty. 
  This man has a prior criminal record 
that involves burglary and robbery 
convictions, and those offenses are, by any 
definition, and by the definition in the 
statute, violent felonies which trigger the 
mandatory minimum 15-year sentence. 
 
 The Court:  Yes.  Well, from my review of the 
presentence report, I believe, too, that the 
conviction in 1982 for burglary, in 1984 for 
robbery, two counts, which is not counted as 
a separate offense for these purposes, and 
then the incident in 1992 of robbery1 all 
                     
1
.   The court treated the 1984 convictions for the 1983 
robberies as a single conviction for purposes of enhancement 
because they were consolidated for sentencing in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.  We express no view 
on whether these convictions could each serve as a prior robbery 
conviction.  Even if they are counted as a single conviction, 
Watkins still has two prior robbery convictions and one burglary 
conviction, providing the three convictions needed for 
enhancement under the ACCA. Watkins does not challenge the 
constitute crimes of violence that are three, 
at a minimum, and I think enhancement must be 
applied under the law.  How about acceptance 
of responsibility? 
 
App. 23-24 (emphasis added).  Thereafter, Mr. Siegel did not 
speak further about his client's objection to an enhancement 
under the ACCA but went on to address the acceptance of 
responsibility issue.  Thus, the only enhancement issue presented 
in the district court was whether the five felony convictions 
identified in detail in the presentence report were "violent 
felonies" within the meaning of the ACCA. 
 Without the enhancement, the appropriate sentencing 
range under the guidelines would have been between 100 and 125 
months, based on a total offense level of 24 and a criminal 
history category of VI.  With the enhancement and the 2 point 
reduction awarded by the court for acceptance of responsibility, 
Watkins' sentencing range was between 188 and 235 months.  The 
court imposed a sentence at the low end of the range, 188 months 
(15 years and 8 months). 
  
 II. 
 The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), 
requires the district court to impose a minimum 15 year term of 
imprisonment on defendants who are convicted under 18 U.S.C.  
(..continued) 
reliance of the district court on a felony conviction not 
identified in the information. 
§ 922(g)(1) of possessing a firearm and who have three prior 
convictions for "violent felonies."  A "violent felony" is 
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e): 
 (2)  As used in this subsection-- 
 . . . . 
 (B) The term "violent felony" means any crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year . . . that-- 
  (i) has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another; or 
  (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, 
involves use of explosives, or otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.  
 In United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), the 
Supreme Court held that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)'s reference to 
"burglary" was not intended to include all crimes denominated  
"burglaries" under state law.  Rather, "'burglary' in § 924(e) 
must have some uniform definition independent of the labels 
employed by the various States' criminal codes."  Id. at 592.  
The uniform definition chosen by the Court was expressed as 
follows: 
  We conclude that a person has been 
convicted of burglary for purposes of a  
 § 924(e) enhancement if he is convicted of 
any crime, regardless of its exact definition 
or label, having the basic elements of 
unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or 
remaining in, a building or structure, with 
intent to commit a crime. 
Id. at 599.   
 The Supreme Court further held in Taylor that, in order 
to determine whether a prior crime comes within this generic 
definition of burglary, a sentencing court should look to the 
state's "statutory definition of the prior offense" of which the 
defendant was convicted.  Id. at 602.  Similarly, a sentencing 
court must look to the "statutory definition of the prior 
offense" to determine whether that offense comes within the scope 
of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) or is an offense involving "conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" 
so as to qualify as a "violent felony" under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  
However, when the "statutory definition of the prior offense" is 
broad enough to permit conviction based on conduct that falls 
outside of the scope of § 924(e)(2)(B), it becomes necessary to 
look beyond the statute of conviction.  Only in such cases may 
the sentencing court look to the facts of the particular case in 
order to determine whether the trier of fact necessarily found 
elements that would qualify the offense as a "violent felony" 
under § 924(e)(2)(B).  See United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 
1234, 1235 (1st Cir. 1992) (court may look to facts of the crime 
to determine if conviction under an  over-inclusive statute 
satisfies § 924(e)(2)(B)); United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980, 
984 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Sweeten, 933 F.2d 
765, 771-72 (9th cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Gallman, 907 




 Before us, Watkins makes a single argument: 
  Given Mr. Watkins' objections, it is 
submitted that the government's failure to 
present documentary evidence of the prior 
convictions constituted a failure to meet its 
burden of proof.  At a minimum, the 
prosecutor at an ACCA sentencing hearing 
should be required to introduce into the 
record copies of the relevant judgments of 
conviction. 
Appellant's Brief at 9.   
 Although we think it unlikely based on the district 
court record and the authority cited by Watkins, he may be 
arguing here that the information reported in the presentence 
report, without certified judgments of conviction, provided 
inadequate support for the district court's factual finding 
concerning his criminal history.  If so, we believe Watkins is 
clearly mistaken.  Watkins did not assert before the district 
court that the information provided in the presentence report was 
an inaccurate account of what had happened in the past.  Rather, 
his sole argument in the district court was that the information 
reported there, as a matter of law, did not satisfy  
§ 924(e)(2)(B)'s requirement of three prior "violent felonies."  
It is well established in this circuit, and all others, that a 
sentencing court may rely on the facts set forth in the 
presentence report when their accuracy is not challenged by the 
defendant.  See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32(b)(6)(D); United States v. 
Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1976) (failure to request 
evidentiary hearing on hearsay information in presentence report 
waives defendant's objection to sentencing court's reliance on 
such hearsay); United States v. Bregnard, 951 F.2d 457, 459 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (although assault and battery statutes included non-
violent conduct, district court did not err in concluding that 
prior assault and battery convictions were "violent felonies" 
when it relied, without objection by defendant, on the factual 
narrative of the prior convictions in the presentence report), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2939 (1992). 
 As we have indicated, however, we think it more likely 
that Watkins is not challenging the district court's reliance on 
the presentence report as the basis for its findings of fact.  
His argument is, rather, that the information in the presentence 
report was inadequate (and certified copies of the judgments were 
required) to support the district court's legal conclusion that 
Watkins' prior convictions were for "violent felonies" within the 
meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B).  This would be consistent with his 
argument to the district court and with his reliance on United 
States v. Potter, 895 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 
U.S. 1008 (1990).  The court there suggested that a sentencing 
court "should have copies of the judgments of conviction before 
it when determining whether a defendant has previously been 
convicted of 'violent felonies' within the meaning of § 
924(e)(1)."  Id. at 1238.  The court supported this suggestion 
with the following rationale: 
 [I]t is important that the sentencing court 
and the appellate court be certain of the 
specific statutory sections under which the 
defendant previously was convicted; all too 
often a popular description of a prior 
offense will not enable the court to 
determine whether the relevant statute falls 
within the coverage of § 924(e)(1).  Our 
analysis in Sherbondy directs the sentencing 
court and the court of appeals to the 
statutes under which the defendant previously 
was convicted to determine whether he was 
convicted of "violent felonies" within the 
meaning of § 924(e)(1).  The consequences of 
such determinations for the defendant are 
severe.  Although the defendant may have done 
nothing more than be found in possession of a 
firearm, if the sentencing judge determines 
that he has been convicted of three prior 
"violent felonies," the court has no choice 
but to sentence him to prison for a minimum 
of fifteen years, with no possibility of 
parole.  Given the gravity of the penalty and 
Sherbondy's emphasis on the statutory 
elements of the prior offense, we conclude 
that a court should have copies of the 
judgments of conviction before it when 
determining whether a defendant has 
previously been convicted of "violent 
felonies" within the meaning of § 924(e)(1), 
although we do not foreclose the possibility 
that a defendant's conviction under a 
specific statutory section or subsection 
might be established by some other form of 
clearly reliable evidence.  A presentence 




 Watkins, however, overlooks the context in which this 
passage was written.  The Potter court was concerned with the 
"quantum of proof necessary to determine that a given prior 
conviction was for a 'violent felony' under § 924(e)(1)" where 
the statute of conviction had several subsections defining 
particular offenses, not all of which would constitute "violent 
felonies." Id. at 1237.  In Potter, one of the defendant's three 
prior convictions was for rape, but the California rape statute 
categorized certain deceptive, though non-violent, conduct as 
rape.  Thus, the court found that the presentence report's 
"popular description" of a prior offense could not be used to 
establish under which subsection of a multi-section statute the 
defendant previously was convicted.  Id. at 1237-38.  The court, 
however, affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant 
failed to show that the district court's reliance on the 
presentence report prejudiced his rights because he had, in fact, 
conceded the application of § 924(e).  Id. at 1238. 
 Watkins is forced to argue a far broader proposition 
than the one endorsed in Potter, however.  Here, the information 
provided in the presentence report enabled the district court to 
ascertain with certainty the statutes of conviction and the 
statutes of conviction encompass only conduct that falls within 
the scope of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).  Watkins cannot, and 
does not, assert otherwise.2  As a result, Watkins is forced to 
argue for a per se rule that certified copies of the judgments of 
conviction are required in every case before a sentencing court 
may determine that the defendant's prior convictions are for 
"violent felonies" within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B).  We find 
no persuasive justification for such an inflexible rule and 
decline to adopt it. 
 
                     
2
.  Watkins' burglary conviction was for violating 18 Pa.C.S.A.  
§ 3502, Pennsylvania's only burglary statute, which defines 
burglary in a manner consistent with, though somewhat more 
narrowly than, the generic "burglary" that Congress intended in § 
924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 
    Watkins' robbery convictions were for violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. 
§ 3701, Pennsylvania's only robbery statute.  We have previously 
held that conviction under this statute necessarily involves the 
"use or threat of physical force" which qualifies for ACCA 
treatment as a "violent felony."  United States v. Preston, 910 
F.2d 81, 86-87 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1103 (1991).   
 IV. 
 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
